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Abstract
We introduce a theoretical framework that contributes to the un-
derstanding of non-communicable chronic diseases’ (NCDs) epidemics:
even if NCDs are non-infectious diseases, they may spread due to the
social transmission of unhealthy activities such as unhealthy diet, phys-
ical inactivity, and smoking. In particular, we study the intergener-
ational dimension of this mechanism. We find that, due to the social
transmission of NCDs, agents choose lower health conditions and higher
unhealthy activities than what is socially optimal. Taxes on unhealthy
activities, that may subsidize health investments, can be used to restore
the social optimum. Finally, our model is consistent with the existence
of regional asymmetries regarding the prevalence of obesity and NCDs.
Keywords: Health capital, Chronic diseases and obesity, Social trans-
mission.
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1 Introduction
Non-communicable chronic diseases (NCDs) are “diseases or conditions (...)
that affect individuals over an extensive period of time and for which there are
no known causative agents that are transmitted from one affected individual
to another.” (Daar et al., 2007, p. 494). Despite being non-infectious NCDs
are considered an epidemic because of their high prevalence rates. Indeed,
according to Abegunde and Stanciole (2006), NCDs are increasing worldwide
accounting for over half of the total deaths in the world.1 Moreover, besides
death, NCDs also lead to substantial disability. Examples of NCDs are car-
diovascular diseases (mainly heart disease and stroke), cancers, respiratory
diseases, diabetes, and musculoskeletal disorders like osteoarthritis.
In this paper, we provide an economic modeling of NCDs’ epidemic mecha-
nism enhancing its intergenerational determinants. Our contribution is also in
view of understanding NCDs’ economic implications and which policy instru-
ments can be used to enhance welfare. Additionally, we attempt to contribute
to the analysis of cross-country differences associated with the incidence of the
epidemics of NCDs.
In general, epidemics have been widely studied from a medical perspec-
tive, paying special attention to the mathematical modeling of the epidemics
of infectious diseases.2 However, there is a general agreement regarding the
lack of explicit epidemics’ economic modeling (Boucekkine et al., 2008, for
a survey). Indeed, even if the epidemics mechanism has already been mod-
eled for infectious diseases (Young, 2005; McDonald and Roberts, 2006; and
Philipson, 2000), to our knowledge it has not yet been modeled for NCDs.
Still, there are several empirical studies that focus on the relationship between
economics and the prevalence of NCDs (see for instance Cumming, 1936; Lave
and Seskin, 1971; Cropper, 1981; Mitchell, 1990; and Suhrcke et al., 2006). In
contrast, from a theoretical point of view, the economic mechanisms behind
NCDs’ epidemics are still far from being understood.
The literature on the epidemics’ economic modeling distinguishes between
short and long-lived epidemics. A short-lived epidemic takes place in a very
short period, after which the economy returns to its initial epidemiological en-
1The World Health Organization (WHO) points out that, even if NCDs have been com-
monly associated with the elderly of wealthy countries being responsible for 87% of deaths
in these countries, at the present time NCDs are actually the major cause of death all over
the world, except for Sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, WHO (2008) estimates 35 million
deaths each year due to NCDs.
2A typical example in epidemiology is the well-known Compartmental Model (see for
instance Kermack and McKendrick, 1927, 1932 and 1933; Bailey, 1975; Anderson and May,
1992; and Kuznetsov and Piccardi, 1994).
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vironment. Therefore, short-lived epidemics are usually modeled as shocks on
the initial conditions of the economy. Examples are the Black Death (Herlihy,
1997; and Hansen and Prescott, 2002) and the Spanish Flu (Boucekkine et
al., 2008). On the other hand, long-lived epidemics are associated with long
periods of disease and hence their effects cannot be reduced to a story of initial
conditions shocks. As a result, the theory rationalizing this kind of epidemics
turns out to be more complex. An example is HIV (see for instance Young,
2005; McDonald and Roberts, 2006; and Boucekkine et al., 2009). NCDs are
indeed another example of long-lived epidemics. However, because they are
non-infectious, the lack of knowledge about the dynamical mechanisms be-
hind NCDs epidemics and economics calls for further theoretical effort. Our
aim is precisely to contribute to the economic modeling of NCDs epidemics’
dynamical mechanism.
The main causes of NCDs are genetics and age, as well as modifiable risk
factors, such as unhealthy diet, physical inactivity, and smoking (WHO, 2005).
Our analysis does not consider genetics nor population aging, but focus instead
on the contribution of modifiable risk factors to the NCDs epidemics. In reality,
while there is a common agreement regarding the genetic propensity to develop
some NCDs, the recent increase in NCDs prevalence−as for example the double
of obesity in the US (Cutler et al., 2003) and its increase by threefold in many
European countries (WHO, 2009) in the last 30 years−cannot be supported
by a similar genetic change (Hill and Peters, 1998). In turn, it is estimated
that 80% of the premature deaths due to heart disease, stroke and diabetes
can be avoided with appropriate behavior regarding modifiable risk factors
and pharmaceuticals (Daar et al., 2007). The novelty of our approach is to
give emphasis to the role of modifiable risk factors in preventing NCDs and to
consider its intergenerational transmission, which contributes to explain the
epidemic dimension of NCDs.
In particular, we present an overlapping generations model in which agents
live for three periods (childhood, adulthood and old age), and where the dy-
namics of the economy are based on health capital accumulation (Grossman,
1972). All economic decisions are made at adulthood and therefore parents
decide upon their consumption levels and those of their children. More specif-
ically, parents decide upon consumption levels of unhealthy goods (as for ex-
ample salt, secondhand smoking, saturated fat) and prevention ones (physical
activity, medical care, etc.) that affect the level of health capital of the follow-
ing period. The intergenerational NCDs’ transmission is introduced through
two different effects. The first one assumes that children inherit their par-
ents’ health capital that is affected by their parents’ choices of consumption
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of unhealthy and prevention goods. The second considers that a agent’s prob-
ability of suffering from a NCD when old depends on her adulthood health
capital, which is affected by both her own choices and the inherited health
capital. Assuming that individuals are not perfectly altruist, an externality
arises since parents do not fully account for the effects of their choices on their
children’s health. Therefore, the decentralized equilibrium is inferior to the
social planner solution. We then analyze how policy instruments such as a tax
on the unhealthy goods, that may subsidize health investments, can be used to
recover the social optimum. Our model also captures the existence of different
development regimes linked to the presence of health thresholds. This provides
therefore a reasoning for different regional NCDs prevalence rates. Moreover,
we also study the role of health education (informational programs) on the
level of health capital, NCDs prevalence rates, and how it affects the optimal
policy. From a public policy perspective and given the health and socioeco-
nomic costs associated to NCDs, it is important to understand the mechanisms
behind its wide and fast spread. We highlight how the social intergenerational
transmission mechanism of the modifiable risk factors can lead to the spread
of NCDs and how policy instruments can be used to limit the prevalence of
these diseases.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature
that provides evidence on NCDs’ social transmission in general and intergener-
ational transmission in particular. In Section 3 we present the model. Section
4 considers the welfare implications of NCDs and, in Section 5, we provide
further analytical results by focusing on the long term effects of early life con-
ditions. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Evidence on NCDs’ social transmission
By definition, NCDs are non-infectious and, as already argued above, the ge-
netic component cannot be responsible for NCDs’ prevalence increase. Con-
sequently, the NCDs epidemics is mainly due to population aging and to the
social transmission of unhealthy behaviors regarding modifiable risk factors.
Social transmission can either occur within peers, family ties and, in particu-
lar, between parents and children, and take, for instance, the form of imitation
behavior or peer effects. Additionally, it can be affected by socioeconomic
factors such as wealth, education, race, age as well as sex or others.
We abstract from any biological determinant of NCDs and focus exclusively
on one of the possible forms of social transmission of behaviors regarding mod-
ifiable risk factors. In point of fact, we analyze the intergenerational trans-
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mission occurring between parents and children concentrating on the effect of
parents’ decision upon their offsprings’ childhood consumption of modifiable
risk factors such as unhealthy diet, physical inactivity or secondhand smoking.
We therefore do not consider peer effects nor imitation, nor add to the problem
any socioeconomic factors.
Additionally, our economic modeling of NCDs’ social transmission is based
on two main assumptions. First, since modifiable risk factors have a negative
impact on health capital, parents’ choices regarding these affect their chil-
dren’s health capital. Second, the accumulation of health capital decreases
the probability of suffering from NCDs at old age and, therefore, parents’
choices regarding modifiable risk factors also affect their children’s probability
of NCDs. In this section we review the literature that provides evidence on
these assumptions.
First, evidence on parents’ choices affecting their children’s health capital
is plentiful. Even if health capital is a complex concept (Grossman, 1972 and
2000) commonly used proxies are height (see, among others, Case and Paxson,
2008; Deaton, 2008; Deaton and Arora 2009; Bozolli et al., 2008; and Steckel,
1995 and 2008; and Silventoinen, 2003) and body mass index (BMI) (see, for
instance, Revicki and Israel, 1986; and WHO, 2004). Therefore, evidence on
parents’ choices affecting their children’s height or BMI, as well as evidence
on correlation between parents’ and children’s heights or BMIs give support
to our assumption. In this regard, Chen and Li (2009) conclude that mother’s
education is an important determinant on a child’s health, as measured by
height-for-age-z-score. Additionally, the authors find the effect to be similar
between adoptees and own-birth children putting therefore in evidence that
behavior, just as genetics, is a channel of health transmission. Currie and
Moretti (2003) also find that mothers attending college had a significant impact
on children’s health, but Lindeboom et al. (2009) do not find any evidence
of increasing the school leaving age of one year and offsprings’ health. The
latter authors remark that parents’ education affecting children’s health may
be present only at sufficiently high education levels. Finally, using data of
individuals exposed to the Chinese famine of 1959-61, Chen and Zhou (2007)
and Meng and Qian (2006) conclude that early life malnutrition decreases adult
height. Concerning obesity, a prominent example of parents’ choices affecting
children’s health is tobacco consumption by pregnant women. Indeed, despite
causing low birth-weights, it contributes to children’s obesity at several ages
(see for example Adams et al., 2005; Lake et al. 1997; Mamun et al., 2006; and
Mendez et al., 2008). Moreover, there is a common agreement that children
of obese parents are more likely to be obese at all ages, including adulthood
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(among others, Branca et al., 2007; and Abu-Rmeileh et al., 2008). Part of
obesity’s transmission is obviously due to genetics. Still, the recent obesity
prevalence increases cannot be supported by a similar genetic change (Hill and
Peters, 1998). Accordingly, Bouchard (1996) estimates genetics to explain just
between 25% and 40% of obesity rates increase, in accordance with Sacerdote’s
(2007) finding (46%).
Second, there is evidence of parent’s choices affecting their children’s prob-
ability of suffering from NCDs at old age (see, for instance, Osmond and
Barker, 2000). Indeed, low birth weight is associated with increased proba-
bility of coronary heart diseases and diabetes in later life: the mechanism at
stake is that fetal growth restriction, due amongst others to maternal smoking
and unhealthy diet, may imply a reprograming of the metabolism. Barker
and Clark (1997) and Godfrey and Barker (2000) survey this literature, and
Victoria et al. (2008), Montgomery and Ekbom (2002), and Eriksson et al.
(2001) provide further results. Also Lindeboom et al (2010) using historical
data for the Netherlands find evidence that early life exposure to the 1846-47
famine results in lower survival rates at old ages for men.
3 Setup
Let us assume a discrete-time infinity-horizon economy populated by overlap-
ping generations of agents living for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and
old age. Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞, and all decisions are taken in the
adult period of life. We also consider identical agents within each generation
and no population growth (the size of each generation is normalized to 1). In
this paper we assume that individuals might suffer from a NCD at the old age,
and this will depend on their health capital.
Individual preferences are described by an expected lifetime utility function
Ut(ct, vt, ht+1, pit). Agents care about consumption ct and unhealthy activities
vt, which encompass the modifiable risk factors. Following Grossman (1972,
2000), they are also concerned about their health capital when old ht+1. We
assume that individuals may suffer from a NCD at old age with a probability pit.
Moreover, we consider that Ut(·) is a strictly increasing function of ct, vt, and
ht+1, but decreasing in pit.
3 In particular, as in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002),
we can consider the following function in order to get closed-form solutions:
Ut(ct, vt, ht+1, pit) = µ ln ct +λ ln vt + (1− pit)γ lnht+1 + pitγ(1−φ) lnht+1, (1)
3We also assume that ∂2Ut(·)/∂c2t , ∂2Ut(·)/∂v2t , ∂2Ut(·)/∂h2t+1 < 0, limct→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂ct,
limvt→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂vt, limht+1→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂ht+1 = +∞ (see, for instance, Acemoglu, 2009).
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where µ, λ > 0 represent, respectively, the weight that agents give to con-
sumption and unhealthy activities, γ > 0 stands for their concern about future
health capital, and φ ∈ [0, 1] represents the disutility of suffering from a NCD,
which as a result of disease’s morbidity and time loss because of treatment
reduces utility driven from health capital.4
Consistently with the extensive medical literature on NCDs reviewed in
Section 2, we assume that the probability of suffering from a NCD is a de-
creasing function of agent’s adulthood health capital, i.e., pit = pi(ht+1), such
that ∂pi(ht+1)/∂ht+1 < 0, limht+1→ 0 pi(ht+1) = piH and limht+1→∞ pi(ht+1) = piL,
with 0 < piL < piH < 1.
Adult agents allocate their exogenous income wt among consumption, un-
healthy activities, and health investments mt as medical care and physical
activity. The corresponding budget constraint is
wt = ct + vt +mt. (2)
As in Grossman (1972, 2000), our model assumes that health capital accu-
mulates over time. In particular, we consider the following law of motion:
ht+1 = (1− δ)ht + σmt − αvt, (3)
where 0 < δ < 1 and σ, α > 0. In this expression, δ represents the depreciation
rate of health capital, σ is the effectiveness of health investment, and α is the
reduction of health conditions due to the unhealthy activities of individuals.
Consistently with Grossman (1972, 2000), we assume that δ is not affected by
illness. However, a disease induces utility loss through the parameter φ in (1).5
Equation (3) considers that health capital at the old age ht+1 is a function
of the inherited health capital ht. However, agents may modify their health
capital through health investments and unhealthy activities during adulthood.
But this also means that individual choices modify their children’s inherited
health capital as well. As a result the intergenerational transmission of NCDs
occurs through two different channels: A direct effect, since parents’ choices
have a direct impact on their children’s inherited health capital (ht+1), and an
indirect effect, since parents’ choices also affect their children’s probability of
4One can observe that our setup also allows for two extreme cases: mortal disease (φ = 1),
and negligible morbidity (φ = 0).
5Notice that, in our model, ht+1 is the stock of health capital at the beginning of period
t+1, and the expected utility of health capital when old is thus given by (1− pit)γ lnht+1 +
pitγ(1 − φ) lnht+1. An alternative modeling of the effect of the disease could consider a
reduction of ht+1 in (3). However, this would imply that children also inherit the disease,
which is not appropriate for NCDs because they are non-communicable diseases by definition.
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developing a NCD at the old age (pi(ht+2)).
6 Therefore, if individuals do not
internalize these effects NCDs will spread to future generations. Thus, still ac-
knowledging that NCDs are non-infectious diseases, we model NCDs’ epidemics
based on a intergenerational transmission mechanism related to modifiable risk
factors.
Finally, we also consider that agents may have a limited perception of the
effect of the unhealthy choices on their own health and face a “perceived” law
of motion of health capital
hpt+1 = (1− δ)ht + σmt − αvt, (4)
where 0 <  < 1 represents agent’s health information level. This assump-
tion is consistent with evidence of poor nutritional knowledge not only of the
population in general (Vereecken and Maes, 2010; Grimes et al., 2009; and
Schwartz et al. 2005) but also of physicians (Flynn et al., 2003; and Makowske
and Feinman, 2005). Additionally, there is evidence that greater nutritional
knowledge is related to better nutrition (Kolodinsky et al., 2007; Pollard et
al. 2010; and Vereecken and Maes, 2010). Still, when, as is the case of NCDs,
health-risks have mainly long-term consequences, limited perception of health
effects frequently arises.7
4 Welfare implications of NCDs
In this section we show that a major consequence of the social transmission
of NCDs is that individual choices are socially non-optimal. We establish this
result for a general utility function Ut(.), under the conditions introduced in
Section 3. In addition, Section 4.3 considers the golden rule problem, which
allows us to provide further analytical results.
4.1 Decentralized solution vs. social optimum
Let us first study the decentralized solution. Individuals choose consump-
tion, unhealthy activities and health investments that maximize their utility
Ut(ct, vt, h
p
t+1, pit) subject to their budget constraint (2), the “perceived” law of
motion of health capital (4), and ct, vt,mt, ht > 0, where wt and ht are taken as
given. For a general utility function, the corresponding first order conditions
6Evidence supporting these two assumptions has been reviewed in Section 2.
7For a theoretical contribution in this regard see, for instance, Cremer et al. (2010). For
the empirical evidence see for example Davison et al. (1991), Frankel et al. (1991), and
Brownell et al. (2009).
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(FOCs) are summarized in the following Euler equation:8
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+ α
(
∂Ut
∂hpt+1
+
∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂hpt+1
)
. (5)
Let us now characterize the social optimum by means of considering a full-
fledge forward-looking planner, which maximizes the social welfare function
β−1U−1 +
∑∞
t=0 β
tUt (ct, vt, ht+1, pit) subject to (2), (3), and ct, vt,mt, ht > 0,
where wt and h0 (initial condition) are taken as given, and β ∈ (0, 1) represents
the inter-temporal discount rate. For this problem the Lagrangian is provided
by
L = β−1U−1 +
∞∑
t=0
βt [Ut (ct, vt, ht+1, pit) + ξt+1Ωt] , (6)
where Ωt = (1−δ)ht+σw−(σ+α)vt−σct−ht+1 and ξt+1 > 0 is the Lagrangian
multiplier (shadow price of health capital). The corresponding Euler equation
is
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+ α
[
∂Ut
∂ht+1
+
∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂ht+1
+ βξt+2(1− δ)
]
. (7)
Comparing this expression with (5), we can conclude that the individual
choices are socially non-optimal. Indeed, for ct and ht+1 = h
p
t+1 given, agents
choose too much unhealthy activities than what is socially optimal (notice that
∂2Ut(·)/∂v2t < 0). Our model points out two sources of inefficiency. First, there
is an intergenerational externality due to the social transmission of NCDs. Ac-
tually, agents do not consider the direct effect of their individual choices on
future health conditions, αβξt+2(1 − δ). Second, because of the limited per-
ception of the consequences of their unhealthy consumption (), they do not
completely account for the indirect effect of their individual behaviour on the
future generation through the probability of suffering from a NCD, α∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂ht+1
.
In fact, if there is no (social) transmission of NCDs (δ → 1) and agents have
a high level of health information (→ 1), (5) and (7) coincide and the decen-
tralized solution is thus socially optimal. Moreover, in the absence of misper-
ception (→ 1) the decentralized solution is still non-optimal, thus justifying
public intervention grounded on the intergenerational transmission of NCDs
and not just because the policy maker is better informed than individuals are.
8Notice that knowing the optimal choices, the dynamics of the economy are completely
characterized by taking the “true” law of motion of health capital (3). Moreover, since
agents inherit their current health conditions, our results would not change if ht is also
introduced in the utility function.
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4.2 Implementing the social optimum
A natural question to raise is how to implement the social optimum. In this
paper we study the case of a tax on unhealthy activities. Real world examples
encompass the typical tobacco and alcohol taxation, and the much debated fat
tax. A fat tax is a surcharge placed upon fattening foods and sugar-sweetened
beverages with the aim of discouraging their consumption. Indeed the con-
sumption of these products is considered a NCD modifiable risk factor since it
contributes to an unhealthy diet and their increased consumption is associated
with obesity epidemics (see for instance Vartanian et al., 2007; and Ludwig
et al., 2001). Currently, fat taxes are being discussed in several countries.9
Not surprisingly, part of the food and beverage industry strongly criticizes
this policy due to sales reduction (see, for instance, Brownell et al., 2009; and
Vartanian et al., 2007). One of their main arguments considers that fat taxes
are against individual freedom: contrary to tobacco and alcohol, the consump-
tion of fattening food and soft drinks does not involve negative externalities
as secondhand smoking and drunk driving accidents (Rudd, 2009). Neverthe-
less, authors as Brownell et al. (2009) and Finkelstein et al. (2009) identify
external effects due to the rise of obesity-related medical expenditures. In
this regard, our paper contributes to this literature by pointing out another
external effect (an intergenerational externality) related to the social trans-
mission of NCDs that may justify the usage of this kind of taxes. However,
several drawbacks of fat taxes have been already identified in the litterature.
A commonly-raised problem is the regressive nature of the policy (Allais et al.,
2010). Nevertheless, several authors (see for instance, Brownell et al., 2009;
Jacobson and Brownell, 2000; and Rudd, 2009) point out that such a problem
is minimized if the revenues of the fat taxes are used in the benefit of the poor.
In this direction, despite that redistribution concerns are beyond the scope of
our paper, we assume that the corresponding tax revenues are used to finance
healthy activities.10
Let us consider the decentralized problem with a tax (τt) on the unhealthy
activities. We use the corresponding tax revenues to subsidize (st) the healthy
activities (see for instance Cremer et al., 2010, for another theoretical contribu-
tion). Individuals maximize Ut(ct, vt, h
p
t+1, pit) subject to (4) and the modified
budget constraint
w = ct + (1− st)mt + (1 + τt)vt, (8)
9In 2009, 33 states in the USA taxed soft drinks (Brownell et al., 2009). Moreover, France
is considering plans to impose a fat tax on junk food (see IGF, 2008; Bonnet et al., 2009;
and Allais et al., 2010).
10For an analytical dynamic setup of income distribution under epidemics, see Boucekkine
and Laffargue (2010).
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taking st and τt as given. Finally, at the equilibrium, stmt = τtvt for all t ≥ 0.
The corresponding FOC is
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+
(
σ
τt
1− st + α
)(
∂Ut
∂hpt+1
+
∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂hpt+1
)
. (9)
Since at the social optimum ht+1 = h
p
t+1, we get the trajectory for the optimal
policy by equating (7) and (9):
τt
1− st =
α
σ
[
(1− ) + β(1− δ)
(
ξt+2
∂Ut
∂ht+1
+ ∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂ht+1
)]
. (10)
Clearly this expression shows that the optimal policy takes into account the two
sources of inefficiency described before, i.e., the intergenerational externality
and the limited perception of the agents. Indeed, as one can expect, in the
absence of transmission mechanism (δ → 1) and misperception ( → 1) the
optimal tax and subsidy vanish.11
4.3 Golden rule
Let us now consider the golden rule defined in Chichilnisky et al. (1995). As in
John and Peccenino (1994), this allocation may be considered as a constrained
social optimum in which the planner maximizes the aggregate surplus at the
steady state, ignoring thus the transition process. The main advantage of this
solution is that it allows us to provide further analytical results regarding social
welfare.
The social planner maximizes U (c, v, h, pi) subject to (2) and (3) at the
steady-state, and c, v,m, h > 0. The corresponding FOC is provided by
∂U
∂v
=
∂U
∂c
+
α
δ
(
∂U
∂h
+
∂U
∂pi
∂pi
∂h
)
. (11)
Similar to the case of full-fledge forward-looking planner, the FOC of the de-
centralized economy (5), at the steady-state, does not coincide with equation
(11) because of the intergeneration transmission of NCDs and the mispercep-
tion problem. As before, we can implement the golden rule by means of a tax
(τ) on the unhealthy consumption and a subsidy (s) on the healthy activities.
Taking ht+1 = h
p
t+1, we get the corresponding policy by equating (9) at the
11Notice that the optimal solution can be also decentralized by means of a tax on unhealthy
activities and a lump-sum transfer Tt of the corresponding tax revenues to the agents (i.e.,
the modified budget constraint would be w+Tt = ct+mt+(1+τt)vt and, at the equilibrium,
Tt = τtvt). In our model, this case is equivalent to consider st = 0.
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steady state with (11):
τˆ ≡ τ
1− s =
α
σ
(
1
δ
− 
)
. (12)
As it is clear from (11) and (12), under a high level of health information
( → 1) and no intergenerational transmission (δ → 1) both FOCs coincide
and, therefore, tax and subsidy become zero (notice that, at the equilibrium,
sm = τv). Moreover, in contrast to (10), now we can see that the greater the
misperception and the intergenerational transmission (i.e., the lower  and δ,
respectively) the higher τˆ (∂τˆ/∂, ∂τˆ/∂δ < 0).12
5 NCDs and early life conditions
Up to now we have assumed that parents affect their children’s probability
to develop NCDs through their impact on the inherited health capital. How-
ever, individuals could counterbalance this effect by investing in health mt
and decreasing unhealthy activities vt, with respectively positive and negative
impacts on the accumulation of health capital and, consequently, lower own
probability of NCDs. To give emphasis to the fact that parents choices affect
their children’s probability of developing NCDs we now analyze the extreme
case in which individuals cannot affect their own probability and therefore
consider pit = pi(ht). Moreover, besides being consistent with the literature
revised below, this case has as well the advantage of improving tractability
from an analytical point of view leading to further and more intuitive results.
Many studies have found a positive correlation between small birth weight
and risk of coronary heart diseases in later life.13 Small birth weight can
nevertheless be associated to genetics and other socioeconomic determinants
affecting as well morbidity at older ages. To circumvent this issue Ravelli et
al. (1998) and Rosebom et al. (2001) analyze data on individuals exposed
to the 1944-45 Dutch famine in early life, considered “a natural experiment”
and therefore uncorrelated with other individual characteristics. They con-
clude that there is a casual effect of early life conditions on the propensity to
develop NCDs at older ages. In particular, individuals exposed to the 1944-45
Dutch famine in early life have reduced glucose tolerance and, additionally,
Rosebom et al. (2001) find that these individuals have higher BMI, higher risk
12For the case of a lump-sum transfer, τˆ = τ (see Footnote 11) and, therefore, the optimal
tax will increase with misperception and intergenerational transmission.
13See for instance Lithell et al. (1996), Stein et al. (1996), Rich-Edwards et al. (1997),
Forsen et al. (1999), Huxley et al. (2000), and Osmond and Backer (2000) and the references
therein.
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of coronary heart diseases and high blood pressure later in life. Also, Linde-
boom et al (2010) find evidence that early life exposure to the Dutch 1846-47
famine results in lower survival rates at old ages for men. The effect that par-
ents affect children’s propensity to develop NCDs at old age is therefore well
documented in the literature, at least for early life.14
5.1 Individual behaviour
Let us consider the decentralized problem of Section 4.1 with pit = pi(ht).
15 In
this case, the Euler equation is provided by
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+ α
∂Ut
∂hpt+1
. (13)
Comparing this expression with (5) one can observe that agents do not consider
now the indirect effect of individual choices on the probability of suffering a
NCD because pit is just affected by early life conditions. Indeed, for ct and h
p
t+1
given, individuals choose more unhealthy activities than in the previous case.
Moreover, since pit = pi(ht) and individuals take ht as given we can provide the
optimal choices’ closed-forms for the utility function (1):
mt =
σ[γ(σ + γ)(1− φpit) + λα]wt − (1− δ)[(λ+ µ)σ + µδ]ht
σ(σ + α)[λ+ µ+ γ(1− φpit)] , (14)
vt =
λ[(1− δ)ht + σwt]
(σ + α)[λ+ µ+ γ(1− φpit)] (15)
and
ct =
µ[(1− δ)ht + σwt]
σ[λ+ µ+ γ(1− φpit)] . (16)
As in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), before completing the equilibrium exam-
ination (see Section 5.2), a comparative statics analysis allows us to provide
an interpretation of the individual optimal choices.16 From (14)-(16) we can
observe that, all other things being equal: first, income (wt) has a positive
effect on consumption, unhealthy activities and health investment. This is an
expected result due to the preferences considered in this paper (see Section 3)
14Obviously, that appropriate data allowing to analyze the effect of parents’ on full-length
childhood conditions and its subsequent impact on the occurrence of NCD later in life is
even more scarce, or non existent, what may explain the absence, to our knowledge, of such
studies.
15As in Section 3, we also assume that ∂pi(ht)/∂ht < 0, limht→ 0 pi(ht) = piH and
limht→∞ pi(ht) = piL, with 0 < piL < piH < 1.
16Notice that pit is endogenously determined at the equilibrium. Actually, the initial
condition h0 > 0 (parameter of the model) allows us to determine m0, v0, and c0. Taking
the transition function (17) and ht, we get ht+1 and, thus, mt+1, vt+1, and ct+1.
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and the absence of mechanisms such as educational choices.17 Second, for a
given probability of NCDs, greater inherited health conditions (ht) will increase
consumption and unhealthy activities, but will decrease health investment: if
inherited health conditions improve, for a given pit, investment in health capital
is less needed. Third, the greater the probability probability of suffering from
a NCD the lower the value of old age (this is equivalent to a reduction of the
discount rate). Therefore, pit has positive effect on consumption and unhealthy
activities, but a negative one on health investment (ht+1 affects the utility at
the old age). Fourth, similarly, a greater disutility of NCD (φ) or a lower
concern about future health capital (γ) will reduce health investment, while
consumption and unhealthy activities will rise. Finally, the more informed is
an agent regarding the negative effect of her unhealthy behavior () the higher
the investment in health and the lower the consumption of unhealthy goods.18
5.2 Equilibrium
The dynamics of our economy are completely characterized by the evolution of
health capital, as given by the “true” law of motion. By substituting (14)-(16)
into (3), we get the corresponding transition function:
ht+1 =
[γ(σ + α)(1− φpi(ht))− (1− )λα][(1− δ)ht + σw]
(σ + α)[λ+ µ+ γ(1− φpi(ht))] ≡ ϕ(ht), (17)
where income is assumed to be constant (wt = w) for the sake of simplicity.
Since we are interested in positive interior solutions, let us first establish a
sufficient condition for ht+1 > 0:
Proposition 1 If NCDs’ morbidity is low enough (φ < φ˜, where φ˜ = 1 −
λα/γσ) then ht+1 > 0. However, if NCDs’ morbidity is high (φ > φ˜) agents
should be sufficiently informed about the effect of the unhealthy activities ( >
˜, where ˜ = λα−(1−φ)γσ
λα+(1−φ)γα) and be enough concerned about their future health
conditions (γ > λα/σ) to ensure positive health capital at old age.
Proof. From (17) we find that ϕ(ht) > 0 iff pit < p˜i, where p˜i =
1
φ
[1− (1−)λα
γ(σ+α)
].
Consequently, p˜i > 1 ⇒ ht+1 > 0 because 0 < pit < 1. Therefore, let us
consider the case p˜i > 1. This sufficient condition can be rewritten as  > ˜,
where ˜ is defined as in Proposition 1. Since  > 0, it is easy to see from the
17Higher income may induce greater education and, thus, greater concern about health.
For income and educational choices see, for instance, Case and Paxson (2008), and Acemoglu
(2009). As we have observed in Section 2, our paper does not focus on income effects.
However, Section 6 provides further discussion in this regard.
18Notice that, due to the assumption of additive separable preferences (1),  does not
directly affect ct. However, it will do it in equilibrium (see Section 5.2).
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definition of ˜ that the condition λα− (1− φ)γσ < 0 implies ˜ < 0 and, thus,
 > ˜. Note also that λα − (1 − φ)γσ < 0 ⇔ φ < φ˜, where φ˜ is defined as in
Proposition 1. Hence, φ < φ˜ is a sufficient condition for ϕ(ht) > 0. Otherwise,
if λα− (1−φ)γσ > 0 (⇔ φ > φ˜) the sufficient condition becomes  > ˜ (notice
that γ > λα/σ is needed to well define φ˜)
Proposition 1 just says that we focus on positive interior solutions. Still
we are able to provide intuition for the intervals imposed on the parameters.
As we have observed in Section 5.1, a high damage (morbidity) of the disease
reduces the value of old age and, thus, health capital. However, agents will
still invest in health if they are (i) sufficiently informed about the effect of
unhealthy activities, i.e., they “understand” the negative health impact of vt
and, thus, are willing to invest more in health; and (ii) enough concerned
about their future, otherwise, if they do not value future they would not invest
in it.19 In contrast, health capital is always positive if NCDs’ morbidity is low
because the expected utility in the second period is sufficiently high.
In this paper we focus on the steady-state equilibrium h∗, which is defined
as a fixed point of the transition function, i.e., h∗ = ϕ(h∗). One can easily
verify that h∗ is stable (unstable) iff ϕ′(h∗) < 1(> 1). As in Azariadis (1996),
and Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), we can assume the following step function
for the probability of disease in order to get further analytical results:
pi(ht) =
{
piH if ht < h
c
piL if ht ≥ hc,
(18)
where hc is an exogenous health threshold. According to this functional form, if
the health conditions of an individual are low (high) enough (hc) the probabil-
ity of suffering from a NCD will be high (low). The existence of health thresh-
olds is well established in the medical literature. Indeed physicians make often
use of thresholds to identify diseases and critical health conditions.20 Moreover
hc, together with piH and piL, may also account for regional differences such as,
for instance, medical technology.
Taking (18), the corresponding transition function is therefore composed
by two branches given by
ϕ(ht) =

[γ(σ+α)(1−φpiH)−(1−)λα][(1−δ)ht+σw]
(σ+α)[λ+µ+γ(1−φpiH)] ≡ ϕpiH (ht) if ht < hc
[γ(σ+α)(1−φpiL)−(1−)λα][(1−δ)ht+σw]
(σ+α)[λ+µ+γ(1−φpiL)] ≡ ϕpiL(ht) if ht ≥ hc.
(19)
19See the comparative statics analysis for  and γ in Section 5.1.
20See, for instance, Yuill and Miller (2008): “cirrhosis in the liver may not result in a
clinical effect until over 50% of the liver has been replaced by fibrous tissue”. Other well
known examples are the thresholds for diabetes, blood pressure, obesity (BMI), etc.
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In this case, we can prove that the dynamics of the model admits two stable
steady-states:
Proposition 2 Assuming the functional form (18) and the conditions stab-
lished in Proposition 1, let us define h∗pii as
h∗pii =
[σψpii − (1− )λα]w
γδψpii + σ(λ+ µ) + α[λ(1− δ) + (µ+ λδ)]
,
where ψpii = γ(σ + α)(1 − φpii), i = {H,L}, and h∗piH < h∗piL. If 0 < h∗piH <
hc < h∗piL, there exist two steady-states given by h
∗
piH
and h∗piL. Instead, if either
0 < h∗piH < h
∗
piL
< hc or 0 < hc < h∗piH < h
∗
piL
, there is a unique steady-state
given by h∗piH and h
∗
piL
, respectively. Moreover, all the steady-states are stable.
Proof. Under Proposition 1, 0 < ϕ′(ht) < 1 for all ht > 0. Then all possible
steady-states are stable. Assuming (18), there exist two steady-states h∗pii for
i = {H,L} if h∗piH < hc < h∗piL (notice that h∗piH < h∗piL since ∂ϕ(ht)/∂pit < 0).
Moreover, the corresponding closed-forms are provided by computing the fixed
points of (19). Additionally one can easily check that if the health capital
threshold is high (low) enough so that 0 < h∗piH < h
∗
piL
< hc (0 < hc < h∗piH <
h∗piL), the economy admits only one steady-state given by h
∗
piH
(h∗piL).
Since ϕpii(ht) is monotonically increasing in ht, we can see that h
∗
pii
is pos-
itively affected by the income (w), the effectiveness of health investment (σ),
the individual concern about future health capital (γ), and agent’s health in-
formation level (). However, a greater disability of NCDs (φ) will reduce the
steady-state value of health capital.21
Figure 1: Dynamics
21Notice that if ϕ(ht) is concave and monotonically increasing in ht, there is a unique
stable steady-state h∗. In this case, we can also conclude from (17) that h∗ is positively
affected by w, σ, γ, and . Moreover, the steady-state value is negatively affected by φ too.
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Figure 1 represents the two possible steady-states, assuming 0 < h∗piH <
hc < h∗piL . In the figure, the intersection between the 45-degree line and ϕpiH
and ϕpiL define the steady-states (for the moment we abstract from the dashed
functions to be used later). The high (low) steady-state is associated with a
high (low) level of health capital and a low (high) probability of suffering from
a NCD. Indeed, if the initial health conditions are high (low) enough (h0 >
(<)hc), the probability of being struck by a NCD is low (high). Therefore,
agents will give a higher (lower) value to their old age. Consequently, this will
induce a higher (lower) investment in health and lower (higher) consumption
and unhealthy activities, and the economy will end up in the high (low) steady-
state.22
Finally, we can point out that multiple steady-states may support the exis-
tence of regional asymmetries in what concerns obesity and NCDs in general.
Even restricting ourselves to Europe, we can identify meaningful differences
among countries. In 2005 in France, for example, 8% of men and 7% of women
are obese, contrasting enormously with 21% of men and 24% of obese women
in the United Kingdom (WHO, 2009). Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) have
also found evidence of country asymmetries with respect to hypertension.
5.3 Welfare analysis
In this section we study the welfare implications of NCDs when pit = pi(ht),
taking advantage of the analytical tractability of this case with respect to
Section 4.
5.3.1 Social optimum
Let us consider the social optimum problem of Section 4.1 with pit = pi(ht).
The corresponding FOCs are summarized by
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+ α
{
∂Ut
∂ht+1
+ β
[
∂Ut+1
∂pit+1
∂pit+1
∂ht+1
+ ιt+2(1− δ)
]}
. (20)
Comparing this expression with (13), we can see that the individual choices
are socially non-optimal and, for ct and ht+1 = h
p
t+1 given, agents choose too
22As pointed out in this section, we have assumed the step function (18) in order to
provide closed-form solutions (see sections 5.2 and 5.3.2). Indeed, this functional form may
be considered as a discretized version of a concave-convex pit (in Figure 1, the sigmoid
dashed curve corresponds to the transition function of a concave-convex pit). However, a
step-simplification is not possible for pit = pi(ht+1): this function must be differentiable in
its whole domain. In this case, we may directly consider a concave-convex function like, for
instance, pi(ht+1) = (piL − piH)h2t+1/(1 + h2t+1) + piH . Nevertheless, the analysis would be
restricted to numerical results that we leave for future research.
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much unhealthy activities than what is socially optimal. Indeed, individuals
do not account neither for the direct nor for the indirect effect. The difference
with respect to Section 4.1 is that even under low misperception ( → 1) the
indirect effect β ∂Ut+1
∂pit+1
∂pit+1
∂ht+1
does not vanish.
Similar to the previous case, we can decentralized the social optimum by
means of a tax (τt) on the unhealthy activities, that we use to subsidize (st)
the healthy ones. The individuals’ FOC is now given by
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+
(
σ
τt
1− st + α
)
∂Ut
∂hpt+1
, (21)
and, taking ht+1 = h
p
t+1, the optimal policy is provided by equating (20) and
(21):
τt
1− st =
α
σ
{
(1− ) + β
[
∂Ut+1
∂pit+1
∂pit+1
∂ht+1
+ (1− δ)ιt+2
∂Ut
∂ht+1
]}
. (22)
As expected the optimal tax accounts for the direct and indirect effects,
and for misperception. Let us compare this expression with (10). In the
previous case the indirect effect was not fully internalized due to misperception.
Assuming instead pit = pi(ht) reinforces the intergenerational externality, even
in the absence of misperception, and consequently the optimal policy increases
with respect to (10) (for instance, a higher fat tax in the case of a lump-sum
transfer). Similarly to the previous case, (13) and (20) coincide under a high
level of health information ( → 1) and absence of transmission mechanism
of NCDs (δ → 1 and ∂pit+1
∂ht+1
= 0). Then, the corresponding tax and subsidy
vanish. Finally, as in Section 4, the decentralized solution is socially non-
optimal even without misperception. Therefore, public intervention would be
again justified due to the intergenerational transmission of NCDs and not just
because of information asymetries.
5.3.2 Golden rule
Let us consider the golden rule. Since it maximizes the aggregate surplus at the
steady state, one can easily verify that this social planner problem is identical
to the one of Section 4.3, with the corresponding Euler equation provided
by (11). The difference between this section and Section 4.3 relies on the
individual behaviour and, in particular, on the assumption pit = pi(ht). Clearly,
due to both the intergeneration transmission of NCDs and the misperception
problem, condition (11) does not coincide with the FOC of the decentralized
economy (21) at the steady-state. However, we can implement the golden rule
by means of a tax (τ) on the unhealthy consumption and a subsidy (s) on the
17
healthy activities. Taking ht+1 = h
p
t+1, the golden rule policy is provided by
equating (11) with (21) at the steady state:
τ
1− s =
α
σ
[(
1
δ
− 
)
+
1
δ
∂U
∂pi
∂pi
∂h
∂U
∂h
]
. (23)
By comparing (12) and (23) we confirm that, due to the presence of the indirect
effect, the optimal policy has to be higher than before. Moreover, as one
can also expect, in the absence of both misperception problem ( → 1) and
intergenerational transmission (δ → 1 and ∂pi
∂h
= 0) the FOCs coincide and,
consequently, tax and subsidy vanish.
Considering the functional forms (1) and (18) allow us to characterize fur-
ther analytical results. Taking (2) and (3) at the steady-state, and (11), the
golden rule values for health capital and unhealthy activities are respectively:
hgpii =
γσ(1− φpii)w
δ[(λ+ µ) + γ(1− φpii)] (24)
and
vgpii =
λσw
(σ + α)[(λ+ µ) + γ(1− φpii)] , (25)
for i = {H,L}.23 As it is clear from Proposition 2, the individual choices are
different from the golden rule allocation. Indeed, we can claim that due to the
transmission mechanism of NCDs and the misperception problem agents will
choose too many unhealthy activities and too little health capital:
Proposition 3 At the steady-state, under Proposition 2, individuals choose
higher quantity of unhealthy activities and lower health capital than the golden
rule allocation.
Proof. Taking (15) at the steady state and (25), it is easy to see that v∗pii > v
g
pii
since  < 1 and, from Proposition 2, h∗pii > 0, for i = {H,L}. Let us show that
h∗pii < h
g
pii
, for i = {H,L}. It is sufficient to prove that ϕpii(ht) < ϕgpii(ht), for all
ht > 0, where ϕ
g
pii
(ht) = (1− δ)ht + σmgpii − αvgpii (the corresponding pii-branch
for the golden rule problem). Using (2) and (3) in the golden rule problem,
we get mgpii =
[λα+γ(σ+α)(1−φpii)]w
(σ+α)[(λ+µ)+γ(1−φpii)] > 0. Therefore, taking (25), ϕ
g
pii
(ht) =
[(λ+µ)+γ(1−φpii)](1−δ)ht+γσ(1−φpii)w
(λ+µ)+γ(1−φpii) . Rearranging terms in (19) we get ϕpii(ht) =
23Without loss of generality, this paper focuses on the case of a golden rule allocation
associated to each steady-state established in Proposition 2. Actually, it is easy to see
from Figure 1 that multiplicity arises if hgpiH < h
c < hgpiL (notice that h
g
piH < h
g
piL since
∂hgpii/∂pii < 0). However, if h
c < hgpiH , the golden rule allocation is unique and given by
hg = hgpiL . In this case, one can verify that the results provided in this section remain the
same.
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[γ(1−φpii)−( 1−σ+α )λα][(1−δ)ht+σw]
(λ+µ)+γ(1−φpii) . Finally, by comparing these two expressions, we
conclude that ϕpii(ht) < ϕ
g
pii
(ht), for all ht > 0
Furthermore, from (2) we can also verify that agents choose too much con-
sumption (c∗pii > c
g
pii
) and too little health investment (m∗pii < m
g
pii
) at the
steady-state. From (23) and assuming the step function (18), the correspond-
ing policy to implement the golden rule is now given by
τpii
1− spii
=
α
σ
(
1
δ
− 
)
. (26)
Moreover, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In our setting, the golden rule allocation can be decentralized
by means of a tax τpii on the unhealthy consumption, and a subsidy spii on the
healthy activities, which is financed by the τpii revenues. The corresponding
closed-forms are given by
τpii =
τ˜
1 +
vgpii
mgpii
τ˜
(27)
and
spii = τpii
vgpii
mgpii
, (28)
where τ˜ = α
σ
(
1
δ
− ) and vgpii
mgpii
= λσ
λα+γ(1−φpii)(σ+α) .
Proof. From (26) we know that
τpii
1−spii
decentralizes the golden rule allocation.
Since spiim
g
pii
= τpiiv
g
pii
, we get (27) and (28). Finally, from (25) and the formula
of mgpii (see the proof of Proposition 3) we obtain the expression for v
g
pii
/mgpii
Finally, from this proposition we can also conclude that the greater the
misperception problem (i.e, the lower ) the greater should be the tax and
the subsidy.24 This result points out the importance of considering agent’s
health information level to study the economic impact of this kind of policies.
In this regard, Allais et al. (2010) predict little effect of fat taxes on French
consumers. However, they also recognise that their study does not include the
effect of informational programs. Indeed, Pollard et al. (2009) conclude about
the substantial effectiveness of the “Go for 2&5” (2 fruits and 5 vegetables a
day) campaign in Australia. Moreover, Bonnet et. al (2009), using the same
data base as Allais et al. (2010), show that the estimated price elasticities of
individual consumption are significant and may justify a tax on high density
and cheap energy categories of food such as junk food as effective policy to
24Notice that a greater the intergenerational transmission (i.e., a lower δ) also increases
both tax and subsidy (∂τpii/∂δ, ∂spii/∂δ < 0).
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reduce obesity and overweight.25 For further empirical results in the same
direction see, for instance, Mytton et al. (2007) and Epstein et al. (2007).
6 Concluding remarks
Our contribution highlights how the social intergenerational transmission of
the modifiable risk factors can lead to the spread of NCDs and how policy
instruments can be used to limit the prevalence of these diseases. Public inter-
vention is grounded on the existence of a social intergenerational transmission
mechanism and not due to information asymmetries between the policy maker
and the individuals (even though we also analyze this aspect).
Several remarks can be made with regard to our modeling. First, genetics
and aging are also causes for the NCDs epidemics, as well as other forms of
social transmission of modifiable risk factors (see Introduction). Concerning
genetics, one could be misled into thinking that in our setup social and ge-
netic transmission are almost equivalent when pit = pi(ht) because ht is taken
as given by the agent. However, an important difference is that social trans-
mission assumes that even if children receive “mechanically” the probability
pit = pi(ht) parents do not transfer it “mechanically”. In contrast, pit depends
on parents’ rational choices regarding unhealthy activities and health invest-
ments. Actually, the individuals’ choices vt and mt allow them to affect their
health capital at old age and therefore enjoy more/less utility. In turn, if the
transmission was exclusively genetical individuals could not affect the trans-
fer of their stock of health capital ht+1 to their children. Still, in the present
model the parameters h0, h
c, piH and piL may also capture population genetics.
Nevertheless, it remains to be analyzed the effect of inherited genetics hetero-
geneity across individuals on the propensity to develop NCDs. Another aspect
of interest would be to develop a model able to capture population aging and
allowing for the probability of NCDs to increase in age. Moreover, other forms
of social transmission of modifiable risk factors, as network or peer effects,
deserve to be analyzed. However, we believe that microeconomic inspections
would be more suitable in this regard.
Second, since our paper focuses on the intergenerational transmission of
NCDs, we have considered a simple setup that incorporates a social trans-
mission mechanism of the disease. However, we could extend our framework
25Among other things, they find that a 10% increase of junk food prices together with a
10% reduction of fruits and vegetables prices would induce a reduction of the proportion of
overweight (children: -33:64%; adult males: -8.78%; and adult females: -11.65%) and obese
(children: -30.88%; adult males: -11.13%; and adult females: -20.61%).
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by adding other effects behind epidemics. Among them would be an endoge-
nous income effect. Indeed, Boucekkine et al. (2009) have already studied the
interaction between epidemics and income within the context of communica-
ble diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. In particular, they empirically
found a significant effect of this kind of epidemics on educational choices and
wages. Following de la Croix and Doepke (2003), one could endogenize income
in our setup as being a function of human capital w(h˜t): NCDs would affect
income through agent’s educational choices. Finally, another simplification of
our framework is the absence of savings: since in our model health is already
an inter-temporal choice variable we did not include physical capital (savings)
for simplicity. Therefore, one could incorporate savings as a technical exten-
sion of our paper. In this regard the approach introduced by Mariani et al.
(2010) might provide a fruitful possibility.
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